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A Framework for Enabling Privacy Preserving Analysis of Graph Properties 




Nathan Weiss Graduate College, Kean University,  




In the real world, many phenomena can be naturally modeled as a graph whose nodes 
represent entities and whose edges represent interactions or relationships between the entities. 
Past and ongoing research on graphs has developed concepts and theories that may deepen the 
understanding of the graph data and facilitate solving many problems of practical interest 
represented by graphs. However, little of this work takes privacy concerns into account. This 
paper contributes to privacy preserving graph analysis research by proposing a framework for 
enabling privacy preserving analysis of graph properties in distributed graphs. The framework is 
composed of three modules. We discuss the functionality of each module and describe how the 
modules together ensure the privacy protection while retaining graph properties and answer 
users’ queries pertaining to graph properties.  
Keywords: Privacy preserving, graphs, distributed, framework, graph properties.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the real world, many phenomena can be naturally modeled as a graph whose nodes 
represent entities and whose edges represent interactions or relationships between the entities. 
Online social networks, transaction networks in financial services, and peer-to-peer file sharing 
                                                
1 Corresponding author. xhe@kean.edu +1 908 737 5998 
He Enabling Privacy in Distributed Graphs 
 
Proceedings of the Seventh Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Orlando, December 15, 2012. 2 
systems are just a few examples. Moreover, advances in information technology and the ubiquity 
of networked computers have facilitated the creation of large amount of graph data in many 
application domains. Past and ongoing research on graphs has developed concepts and theories 
that may deepen the understanding of the graph data and facilitate solving many problems of 
practical interest represented by graphs (Cormen et al. 2001). Examples include analyzing graph 
properties such as computing the shortest path, finding out the maximum-flow between two 
given nodes in a graph (Cormen et al. 2001), detecting community structures (Newman 2004), 
etc. With the exception of some recent work, not much has been done in the area of analyzing 
graph data from a privacy preserving perspective. However, due to the sensitive and/or personal 
nature of the data, the public release of (or access to) such data, often poses considerable privacy 
risk to the individuals/entities involved (Backstrom et al. 2007). We note that there has been 
extensive research focusing on privacy protection of tabular data (Samarati and Sweeney 1998). 
Due to the interconnectivity of nodes in a graph, privacy preserving graph analysis and 
anonymization has been recognized as a challenging area (Kleinberg 2007). 
Often, the graph data is distributed across different autonomous enterprises. Consider the 
following scenario. In financial sectors, funds may be transferred from one bank account to 
another opened in a different bank. Given large volume of transactions, such transfers can 
eventually form a complex graph structure among bank accounts. For discovering certain illegal 
financial activities (e.g., money laundering and financial fraud), it requires all the data from all 
involved banks. However, due to privacy concerns and legal issues, banks would not be willing 
to disclose their customers' data while without privacy guarantee. Similar concerns among other 
domains, including telecommunications, law enforcement, homeland security, etc. further 
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provide motivations for us to address privacy constraints when dealing with distributed graph 
data (Cauley 2006; Gross and Acquisti 2005; Kleinberg 2007).   
The previous studies in the literature have primarily focused on centralized model where 
a single graph ownership is considered (e.g., Cormode et al. 2008; Hay et al. 2008; Liu and Terzi 
2008; Zhou and Pei 2008).  Under such centralized graph model, certain perturbation operations 
are typically performed on the single original graph meanwhile aiming to satisfy specified 
privacy protection and utility requirements.  The perturbed (anonymized) graph is then released 
so that it can be used for graph analysis and any other purposes.     
In particular, the perturbation techniques include adding/deleting edges and/or nodes as 
well as clustering nodes (Hay et al. 2008; Liu and Terzi 2008; Ying and Wu 2008).  Three types 
of private information disclosure have been identified in the literature (Liu and Terzi 2008): 
identity disclosure, link disclosure, and attribute disclosure.  Identity disclosure occurs when a 
real-world entity or individual is mapped to a particular node in the released graph.  Link 
disclosure occurs when any new sensitive relationships (e.g., edge existence) between two 
entities are revealed. In graph data, attributes may refer to the contents that are associated with 
nodes and/or edges (e.g., edge capacity in the maximum-flow problem). Attribute disclosure 
occurs when an adversary is able to determine the value of an entity's or a relationship's attribute 
that is intended to keep private. Identity disclosure often leads to link and attribute disclosure.      
As with any privacy preserving data releasing and analysis, utility of perturbed graphs is an 
important measure of anonymizing quality. Indeed, it should never be ignored when designing 
and evaluating techniques for privacy protection purposes. For example, adding random noise 
does not compromise privacy but very likely rendering the transformed data useless. Towards 
retaining utility, the existing works have mainly focused on preserving one property or the other 
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of the original graph. In other words, it is quite ad hoc. For instance, Gao et al. only focus on 
preserving shortest distances in anonymized graph (Gao et al. 2011);  Hay et al. mainly aim to 
retain the degree distribution of the original graph (Hay et al. 2009); and Ying and Wu propose 
to preserve the eigenvalue of a graph (Ying and Wu 2008).  In some cases (Cheng et al. 2010; 
Liu and Terzi 2008; Zhou and Pei 2008), only empirical analysis of graph properties is 
conducted on the perturbed graphs.  There is no any guarantee on whether or not the perturbed 
graph will retain the original graph properties.  
The above review of the current literature reveals that the research area of privacy 
preserving graph publishing and analysis is fragmented with ad hoc perturbation techniques 
when achieving narrowly specified privacy and utility goals. None of the existing works has 
taken a holistic and systematic approach. Furthermore, the practical distributed model has not 
been considered in the literature yet, even though it is an area that has recently attracted more 
attention from academics and practitioners (Cauley 2006; He et al. 2008). To fill the gap, the 
paper proposes an integrative framework for enabling privacy preserving analysis of graph 
properties in distributed graphs.  
The paper is organized as follows. Following a literature review on privacy preserving 
graph publishing and analysis, we propose a framework for enabling privacy preserving analysis 
of graph properties in distributed graphs. Finally, we conclude the paper and provide suggestions 
for the future work.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED STUDIES 
In this section, we briefly review relevant literature on privacy preserving graph analysis 
and publishing. In the area of privacy preserving in graphs, specific ad hoc techniques have been 
proposed to protect pre-defined privacy requirements. Some of the existing work primarily 
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focuses on preventing node re-identification through anonymization (e.g., Hay et al. 2008; Liu 
and Terzi 2008; Zhou and Pei 2008). On the other hand, some aim to protect link/association 
disclosure between nodes through edge adding/deleting and/or node clustering (e.g., Bhagat et al. 
2009; Cormode et al. 2008; Ying and Wu 2008).  
Specifically, Hay et al. formalize the ad hoc queries of adversarial knowledge and 
showing the risks of node re-identification in real datasets (Hay et al. 2008). They also propose a 
technique for generalizing a graph by grouping nodes into partitions and then only publish the 
number of nodes in each partition, along with the density of edges that exist within and across 
partitions. Zhou and Pei propose an anonymity approach against 1-neighborhood attack by 
generalizing labels and adding edges so as to make at least k nodes having the same isomorphic 
neighborhood subgraphs (Zhou and Pei 2008). Liu and Terzi present a degree anonymity 
algorithm which guarantees at least k nodes having the same degree in the anonymized graph 
(Liu and Terzi 2008). We shall note that all the above work is built on the principle of k-
anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney 1998). Previously, k-anonymity has been extensively used for 
tabular data.  
Rather than focusing on preventing node reidentification, Ying and Wu study how edge-
based graph perturbations would affect the spectrum properties (eigenvalues) of the graph and 
how the perturbation would protect link privacy (Ying and Wu 2008). Cormode et al. focus on 
the problem of anonymizing bipartite graph and present so called (k, l)-groupings algorithm to 
hide the actual mapping between two types of entities. The groupings lead to strong tradeoffs 
between privacy and data utility (Cormode et al. 2008). This work is further extended by Bhagat 
et al. (Bhagat et al. 2009). An interaction bipartite graph is considered and each node in the graph 
is associated with a set of properties. The proposed approach is based on grouping the entities 
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into classes, and thus masking the mapping between entities and the nodes that represent them in 
the anonymized graph.  
We note that our work extends and complements the above existing work and propose a 
unified framework in the context of distributed graphs for enabling privacy preserving analysis 
of graph properties.    
THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we first describe the problem of privacy preserving computation of graph 
properties in distributed graphs. Then, we provide an overview of the proposed framework 
followed by the more detailed description of each module in the framework.   
Problem Description 
In this study, we consider a distributed graph data model. The private graphs are 
distributed among several data owners. Specifically, we denote these graphs as G1, G2, …, Gk 
owned by data owner 1, data owner 2, …, data owner k, respectively.  The interconnections 
among these graphs result in one single overall graph G. In other words, each of the graphs G1, 
G2, …, Gk is a private subgraph of graph G. The ability of computing the graph properties of 
graph G would be beneficial to not only each proprietary data owner but also to other users 
including various relevant stakeholders. Such ability typically requires the availability of each 
subgraph of graph G. However, due to the privacy and legal concerns as mentioned earlier, each 
data owner may not be willing to disclose his/her own private subgraph while without being 
assured of private data protection.     
In the above distributed setting, we are interested in developing a framework which 
facilitates the computation of graph properties of the overall graph G with privacy preservation. 
In particular, the system based on the framework shall be able to answer a user’s utility queries 
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regarding various graph properties. Those properties may include shortest path length, degree 
distribution, clustering coefficient, maximum-flow between two given nodes, etc. Specific 
privacy protection requirements shall be satisfied depending on the needs of data owners.  In the 
following sections, we describe each functional module of the framework. The functionalities are 
built on both utility and privacy requirements.                   
Overview of the Framework 
The proposed framework consists of three modules as depicted in Figure 1. The first 
module is Graph Transformation Module.  This module is to transform the original graph into a 
perturbed one so that the required privacy protection is assured while maintaining certain graph 
properties.  The second module is to securely integrate the input graphs so that one single overall 
graph can be made available without revealing which edge (node) originally belongs to which 
data owner. This provides further privacy protection in respect to the graph data. Finally, a graph 
properties query evaluation module takes user’s queries and return the value of the querying 
graph properties.   
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Graph transformation module 
In this module, the graph perturbation operations are performed. The inputs of this 
module are the original private graphs, each of which is owned by the respective data owner.  
The date owner may specify the particular privacy requirement and graph properties retaining 
goal that should be satisfied. Such requirements can be passed on to the module through a 
parameter called param.  
The transformation functionality of this module is similar to the graph perturbation that is 
provided in the existing studies (Cheng et al. 2010; Hay et al. 2008; Liu and Terzi 2008; Ying 
and Wu 2008). For instance, in order to prevent node re-identification, random perturbation 
technique through a sequence of random edge-deletion followed by edge-insertions is proposed 
(Hay et al. 2008). However, rather than just focusing on one specific perturbation technique, the 
transformation function in the module may include the various perturbation techniques that are 
targeted to meet the corresponding privacy and graph properties retaining requirements.   
In essence, the graph transformation module acts like a blackbox. The module can be 
viewed solely in terms of its input, output and transformation characteristics without any 
knowledge of its internal workings, that is, its implementation is "opaque".   As mentioned 
earlier, the input includes the original graph with the parameter of specified privacy and graph 
properties retaining requirements.  The module outputs the perturbed version of the original 
graph. 
Secure graph integration module 
Since the graphs are distributed among the data owners, the secure graph integration 
module provides a mechanism that the single integrated overall graph Ĝ can be made available 
without allowing any parties to learn any other information beyond what is revealed by the 
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integrated graph. The implementation of such module typically involves the use of encryption 
cryptosystem to ensure privacy and security. Such cryptosystems have been studied in the field 
of computer science (Cramer et al. 2001; Goldreich 2004). Thus, we can directly utilize some of 
the developed tools to implement this secure integration module (Cramer et al. 2001; Pohlig et 
al. 1978; Rivest et al. 1976).     
Notably, with the privacy and security guarantees resulting from graph transformation 
module and secure graph integration module, the integrated graph can be released after the 
integration. That is, users may use their own graph analysis tools to analyze the integrated graph 
Ĝ.  This provides the flexibility as well as achieves the ultimate goal of privacy preserving graph 
analysis. Nevertheless, we include a graph query evaluation module in the proposed framework 
for the completeness and the intention of meeting various users’ needs.   
Graph query evaluation module 
In this module, the graph analysis tools are included to analyze graph properties of the 
final integrated graph.  It takes the user’s query as an input; such query is evaluated by the graph 
analysis tools and the module returns the result to the user accordingly. Indeed, analyzing graph 
properties is a well-studied topic in graph theory and various graph algorithms have been 
proposed and designed (Chartrand 1985; Cormen et al. 2001). Thus, we can use the tools that 
already developed for analyzing graph properties or develop the corresponding tools according to 
the system requirements for implementing the framework.   
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The research reported here seeks to address the privacy issues involved in the graph data. 
We particularly focus on the distributed graph model. To fill the gap in the existing literature of 
privacy preserving graph analysis and publishing, we propose a unified framework for enabling 
He Enabling Privacy in Distributed Graphs 
 
Proceedings of the Seventh Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Orlando, December 15, 2012. 10 
privacy preserving analysis of graph properties in distributed graphs. The three modules in the 
framework are intended to ensure privacy protection while retaining graph properties of the 
graph as well as answer user queries on graph properties.  
For future work, we would like to initiate new cases and use the real world graph data to 
evaluate the framework. Our ultimate goal is to further refine the framework and implement it 
for practical use.      
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